General requirements for establishing a verification regime in the context of moving towards a nuclear weapon-free world have been the subject of numerous studies during the past decade. The studies presented in this book add significantly to the general discussion by addressing the technical means and procedures for establishing transparency in nuclear warheads and materials in the nuclear weapons states. They examine recent initiatives - not only the US-Russian arms control and security dialogue, but also developments in the other nuclear weapon states. The capacities of the US and Russian nuclear weapon complexes to undertake irreversible warhead elimination are considered, as are the effects of increased transparency on international security. The book analyses proposed arrangements for establishing stockpile declarations, for verifying warhead dismantlement and the storage and disposition of fissile materials, and for monitoring the closure or conversion of nuclear facilities. In this light it provides a comprehensive, in-depth appraisal of a possible role for the IAEA. The contributors represent an exceptionally wide range of experience and knowledge on the increasingly important issue of transparency.