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Web and Internet Economics: 17th International Conference, WINE 2021, Potsdam, Germany, December 14–17, 2021, Proceedings de Michal Feldman

Web and Internet Economics: 17th International Conference, WINE 2021, Potsdam, Germany, December 14–17, 2021, Proceedings: Lecture Notes in Computer Science, cartea 13112

Editat de Michal Feldman, Hu Fu, Inbal Talgam-Cohen
en Limba Engleză Paperback – 21 ian 2022
This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 17th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics, WINE 2021, which was held online during December 14-17, 2021. The conference was originally planned to take place in Potsdam, Germany, but changed to a virtual event due to the COVID-19 pandemic. 

The 41 full papers presented in this volume were carefully reviewed and selected from 146 submissions. They were organized in topical sections as follows: mechanism design and pricing; matching, markets and equilibria; learning, fairness, privacy and behavioral models; social choice and cryptocurrencies.
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Specificații

ISBN-13: 9783030946753
ISBN-10: 3030946754
Pagini: 558
Ilustrații: XIV, 558 p. 65 illus., 48 illus. in color.
Dimensiuni: 155 x 235 mm
Greutate: 0.79 kg
Ediția:1st ed. 2022
Editura: Springer International Publishing
Colecția Springer
Seriile Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Information Systems and Applications, incl. Internet/Web, and HCI

Locul publicării:Cham, Switzerland

Cuprins

Mechanism Design and Pricing.- Two-way Greedy: Algorithms for Imperfect Rationality.- Bayesian Persuasion in Sequential Trials.- The Optimality of Upgrade Pricing.- On Symmetries in Multi-Dimensional Mechanism Design.- Welfare-Preserving $nvarepsilon$-BIC to BIC Transformation with Negligible Revenue Loss.- Strategyproof Facility Location in Perturbation Stable Instances.- Contract Design for A orestation Programs.- Relaxing the independence assumption in sequential posted pricing, prophet inequality, and random bipartite matching.- Allocating Indivisible Goods to Strategic Agents: Pure Nash Equilibria and Fairness.- On the benefits of being constrained when receiving signals.- Towards a Characterization of Worst Case Equilibria in the Discriminatory Price Auction.- Matching, Markets and Equilibria.- Improved Analysis of RANKING for Online Vertex-Weighted Bipartite Matching in the Random Order Model.- Beyond Pigouvian Taxes: A Worst Case Analysis.- The core of housing markets from an agent's perspective: Is it worth sprucing up your home.- Mechanisms for Trading Durable Goods.- Formal Barriers to Simple Algorithms for the Matroid Secretary Problem.- Threshold Tests as Quality Signals: Optimal Strategies, Equilibria, and Price of Anarchy.- The Platform Design Problem.- A Consumer-Theoretic Characterization of Fisher Market Equilibria.- Learning, Fairness, Privacy and Behavioral Models A tight negative example for MMS fair allocations.- Approximating Nash Social Welfare Under Binary XOS and Binary Subadditive Valuations.- Default Ambiguity: Finding the Best Solution to the Clearing Problem.- Planning on an Empty Stomach: On Agents with Projection Bias.- Eliciting Social Knowledge for Creditworthiness Assessment.- Social Choice and Cryptocurrencies.- Decentralized Asset Custody Scheme with Security against Rational Adversary.- The Distortion of Distributed Metric Social Choice.- Maximal Information Propagation via Lotteries.- Envy-free division ofmulti-layered cakes.- Computing envy-freeable allocations with limited subsidies.