Why Law Matters: Oxford Legal Philosophy
Autor Alon Harelen Limba Engleză Paperback – 28 oct 2015
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Specificații
ISBN-13: 9780198766216
ISBN-10: 0198766211
Pagini: 256
Dimensiuni: 159 x 235 x 14 mm
Greutate: 0.41 kg
Editura: OUP OXFORD
Colecția OUP Oxford
Seria Oxford Legal Philosophy
Locul publicării:Oxford, United Kingdom
ISBN-10: 0198766211
Pagini: 256
Dimensiuni: 159 x 235 x 14 mm
Greutate: 0.41 kg
Editura: OUP OXFORD
Colecția OUP Oxford
Seria Oxford Legal Philosophy
Locul publicării:Oxford, United Kingdom
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Recenzii
In a nutshell, the argument works from the premise that there's a right to due process, which includes the right to a hearing. By analogy, Harel argues that there's a process value in constitutionalism and judicial review. Just as it's good to give people a chance to be heard even if the hearing doesn't alter the outcome, it's better for rights to be enforced as a matter of duty - by constitutionalism and judicial mandate - even if the legislature might have done the same thing anyway. I found this argument fascinating, and thought-provoking, especially because it proceeds on such different lines than American debates about judicial review and constitutionalism normally do.
Why Law Matters is a wonderfully bold and inventive book, seeking to demonstrate that a legal system is not merely a useful instrument in pursuit of independently desirable goals, but rather that it has a significant role in constituting those values and goals. On this constitutive account, there are certain things that can only be achieved through distinctively legal form. Harel's catalogue of these distinctively legal goods include both the point of rights and the carrying out of distinctively public functions, covering both punishment and the fighting of wars.
A central theme of Alon Harel's deeply thought and elegantly argued book is the claim that certain legal institutions that are often justified instrumentally, in support of prior and independent values such as certain rights, are really best justified non-instrumentally.
Academic books are usually written according to a plan in which not only the research question is defined, but also the conclusion to be established. Sometimes the conclusion is worked out as the book is written. Rare are the cases in which an author finds himself arguing for the opposite of what he aimed to establish. Alon Harel's Why Law Matters? is such a rare case. In his introduction Harel recalls his views as he set out to write the essays collected in the book: the value of political and legal institutions such as rights, judicial review, and constitutions depends entirely on their contingent instrumental relations to other, independently valuable ends. The book Harel ended up writing defends the opposite view. I believe this is a testament to Harel's intellectual integrity - sincerely asking a question and following the argument where it leads.
As a whole, Harel's book challenges a dominant view in the literature shared by Thomas Aquinas, Jeremy Bentham, Hans Kelsen, contemporary rights theorists, and utilitarians. Under this dominant view, the value of legal institutions is contingent and depends upon the prospects that legal institutions and procedures improve the quality of decision-making. In Harel's view, contingent considerations often miss the point as they purport to rationalize political institutions and procedures in terms that do not capture what makes such institutions or procedures politically and morally attractive. Harel's argument is deeply original and well worth engaging with.
Harel's argument in favor of RC is very original and worth engaging with. It forces one to re-think the meaning and function of law, constitutions and courts. It is a serious attempt to provide a basis for social institutions that Harel believes to be constitutive of justice.
This fascinating volume offers arguments that are both significant and surprising… a major work from a leading writer, it will force many to re-think why and how law matters'. The editors of the Oxford Legal Philosophy book series got it right. Harel's book is a constitutional and philosophical treat. It is innovative and thought-provoking (much like Harel's previous work on related issues). It forces the reader to re-think some major and common assumptions about the law and especially about constitutional procedures and institutions.
Why Law Matters is an indispensable resource for anyone committed to thinking seriously about the justification of the legal institutions and processers that comprise a liberal legal order. While Harel neither purports to offer a general criticism of legal instrumentalism nor a general defense of its non-instrumentalist counterpart, he deftly navigates the challenges surrounding the justification of rights, public institutions, and constitutional arrangements. In this way, his book offers an innovative and deeply valuable engagement with the challenges that any justificatory account must ultimately confront.
There are plenty of legal scholars today writing about matters of pressing public concern, and there are plenty more who write on theoretical topics touching on our deepest commitments about the nature of law and state. But it is a very rare thing to find a writer who engages with the pressing issues of the day in a way that makes clear precisely how our deepest commitments are at stake and who makes a compelling case for thinking about those issues in a new and interesting way. Alon Harel has done just that with his stimulating, challenging, and evocative new book, Why Law Matters. It is a book that raises more questions than it answers. Although I doubt that any reader will be convinced by all its arguments, it is hard to imagine anyone finishing Why Law Matters without having at least some of his most basic beliefs about law and legal institutions unsettled, at least a little.
Why Law Matters is a wonderfully bold and inventive book, seeking to demonstrate that a legal system is not merely a useful instrument in pursuit of independently desirable goals, but rather that it has a significant role in constituting those values and goals. On this constitutive account, there are certain things that can only be achieved through distinctively legal form. Harel's catalogue of these distinctively legal goods include both the point of rights and the carrying out of distinctively public functions, covering both punishment and the fighting of wars.
A central theme of Alon Harel's deeply thought and elegantly argued book is the claim that certain legal institutions that are often justified instrumentally, in support of prior and independent values such as certain rights, are really best justified non-instrumentally.
Academic books are usually written according to a plan in which not only the research question is defined, but also the conclusion to be established. Sometimes the conclusion is worked out as the book is written. Rare are the cases in which an author finds himself arguing for the opposite of what he aimed to establish. Alon Harel's Why Law Matters? is such a rare case. In his introduction Harel recalls his views as he set out to write the essays collected in the book: the value of political and legal institutions such as rights, judicial review, and constitutions depends entirely on their contingent instrumental relations to other, independently valuable ends. The book Harel ended up writing defends the opposite view. I believe this is a testament to Harel's intellectual integrity - sincerely asking a question and following the argument where it leads.
As a whole, Harel's book challenges a dominant view in the literature shared by Thomas Aquinas, Jeremy Bentham, Hans Kelsen, contemporary rights theorists, and utilitarians. Under this dominant view, the value of legal institutions is contingent and depends upon the prospects that legal institutions and procedures improve the quality of decision-making. In Harel's view, contingent considerations often miss the point as they purport to rationalize political institutions and procedures in terms that do not capture what makes such institutions or procedures politically and morally attractive. Harel's argument is deeply original and well worth engaging with.
Harel's argument in favor of RC is very original and worth engaging with. It forces one to re-think the meaning and function of law, constitutions and courts. It is a serious attempt to provide a basis for social institutions that Harel believes to be constitutive of justice.
This fascinating volume offers arguments that are both significant and surprising… a major work from a leading writer, it will force many to re-think why and how law matters'. The editors of the Oxford Legal Philosophy book series got it right. Harel's book is a constitutional and philosophical treat. It is innovative and thought-provoking (much like Harel's previous work on related issues). It forces the reader to re-think some major and common assumptions about the law and especially about constitutional procedures and institutions.
Why Law Matters is an indispensable resource for anyone committed to thinking seriously about the justification of the legal institutions and processers that comprise a liberal legal order. While Harel neither purports to offer a general criticism of legal instrumentalism nor a general defense of its non-instrumentalist counterpart, he deftly navigates the challenges surrounding the justification of rights, public institutions, and constitutional arrangements. In this way, his book offers an innovative and deeply valuable engagement with the challenges that any justificatory account must ultimately confront.
There are plenty of legal scholars today writing about matters of pressing public concern, and there are plenty more who write on theoretical topics touching on our deepest commitments about the nature of law and state. But it is a very rare thing to find a writer who engages with the pressing issues of the day in a way that makes clear precisely how our deepest commitments are at stake and who makes a compelling case for thinking about those issues in a new and interesting way. Alon Harel has done just that with his stimulating, challenging, and evocative new book, Why Law Matters. It is a book that raises more questions than it answers. Although I doubt that any reader will be convinced by all its arguments, it is hard to imagine anyone finishing Why Law Matters without having at least some of his most basic beliefs about law and legal institutions unsettled, at least a little.
Notă biografică
Professor Alon Harel is a Mizock Professor of law and member of the Centre for Rationality at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He is a co-editor of Jerusalem Review of Legal Studies, a member of the editorial board of Criminal Law and Philosophy and a member of the editorial board of New Criminal Law Review. He writes on legal and political philosophy, criminal law theory, constitutional law theory, law and economics and human rights.