Blameworthy Belief: A Study in Epistemic Deontologism: Synthese Library, cartea 338
Autor Nikolaj Nottelmannen Limba Engleză Hardback – 20 iun 2007
The answer to this question may influence the extent to which we are willing to submit each other to punishments ranging from mild resentment to harsh prison terms.
This book presents an extensive effort to shed light on the conditions under which we may appropriately deem someone blameworthy for holding a particular belief. It regiments and unifies several debates within contemporary epistemology, ethics and legal scholarship. Finally, the book brings a new philosophical look on issues like our power to control beliefs and the extent and nature of foresight.
Toate formatele și edițiile | Preț | Express |
---|---|---|
Paperback (1) | 627.43 lei 6-8 săpt. | |
SPRINGER NETHERLANDS – 11 noi 2010 | 627.43 lei 6-8 săpt. | |
Hardback (1) | 633.54 lei 6-8 săpt. | |
SPRINGER NETHERLANDS – 20 iun 2007 | 633.54 lei 6-8 săpt. |
Din seria Synthese Library
- Preț: 543.24 lei
- 15% Preț: 625.52 lei
- 18% Preț: 969.92 lei
- 15% Preț: 584.63 lei
- 18% Preț: 885.61 lei
- 15% Preț: 575.02 lei
- 15% Preț: 682.42 lei
- 18% Preț: 874.82 lei
- 15% Preț: 630.33 lei
- Preț: 282.32 lei
- Preț: 434.20 lei
- 5% Preț: 364.71 lei
- 15% Preț: 624.71 lei
- 18% Preț: 939.44 lei
- 15% Preț: 629.38 lei
- 18% Preț: 1205.69 lei
- 15% Preț: 629.83 lei
- 18% Preț: 980.11 lei
- Preț: 381.87 lei
- 15% Preț: 624.39 lei
- 18% Preț: 932.97 lei
- 18% Preț: 1206.35 lei
- 15% Preț: 632.90 lei
- Preț: 387.90 lei
- Preț: 392.43 lei
- 18% Preț: 1200.62 lei
- 15% Preț: 625.98 lei
- 18% Preț: 1207.09 lei
- Preț: 372.80 lei
- Preț: 386.95 lei
- 15% Preț: 627.43 lei
- 15% Preț: 626.15 lei
- Preț: 374.30 lei
- 15% Preț: 630.01 lei
Preț: 633.54 lei
Preț vechi: 745.34 lei
-15% Nou
Puncte Express: 950
Preț estimativ în valută:
121.24€ • 127.54$ • 101.17£
121.24€ • 127.54$ • 101.17£
Carte tipărită la comandă
Livrare economică 10-24 ianuarie 25
Preluare comenzi: 021 569.72.76
Specificații
ISBN-13: 9781402059605
ISBN-10: 1402059604
Pagini: 300
Ilustrații: XII, 282 p.
Dimensiuni: 155 x 235 x 18 mm
Greutate: 0.59 kg
Ediția:2007
Editura: SPRINGER NETHERLANDS
Colecția Springer
Seria Synthese Library
Locul publicării:Dordrecht, Netherlands
ISBN-10: 1402059604
Pagini: 300
Ilustrații: XII, 282 p.
Dimensiuni: 155 x 235 x 18 mm
Greutate: 0.59 kg
Ediția:2007
Editura: SPRINGER NETHERLANDS
Colecția Springer
Seria Synthese Library
Locul publicării:Dordrecht, Netherlands
Public țintă
Professional/practitionerCuprins
Belief and Acceptance.- Approaching a Conception of Epistemic Blameworthiness.- Blameworthy Belief as Inexcusably Undesirable Belief.- Epistemic Undesirability.- Bruce Russell's Basic Analysis of the Notion of Epistemic Blameworthiness.- Doxastic Control.- Direct Content-Directed Doxastic Control or Doxastic Voluntarism.- Direct Property-Directed Doxastic Control or Property Voluntarism.- Indirect Content-Directed Doxastic Control or Doxastic Pascalianism.- Indirect Property-Directed Doxastic Control or Property Pascalianism.- Intellectual Obligations.- Foresight and Blameworthy Inadvertence to Risk.- Epistemic Blameworthiness Analysed.- Epistemic Autonomy.
Recenzii
“I can only strongly recommend Nikolaj Nottelmann’sbook ‘Blameworthy Belief’. It is the first book-length in-depth study ofepistemic deontologism and develops a conceptually rich, concise and inspiringtheory of epistemic blameworthiness.” (Andrea Kruse, Erkenntnis, Vol. 80, 2015)
"Nikolaj Nottelmann's Blameworthy Belief is unique in being an up-to-date monograph devoted entirely to the problem of a moral appraisal of beliefs and the closely related problem of deciding to believe (doxastic voluntarism and anti-voluntarism). It is argued that rational agents may be appropriate objects of deontic attitudes, in particular blameworthiness. Nottelmann thereby offers an original and in depth defence of the deontological conception of epistemic justification. Blameworthy Belief is bound to become a highly influential work and is of great interest not only to epistemologists, but also to philosophers of law and moral philosophers." Heinrich Wansing, Professor of Philosophy of Science and Logic, Dresden University of Technology, Germany
"Nottelmann has nicely managed to weave accounts of competing views into his discussion, and so this book provides an excellent survey of the literature en route to the development of a sensible account of how we could be said to be responsible for believing various things, even though belief formation is not under our voluntary control." John Heil, Professor of Philosophy, Washington University in St. Louis, U.S.A., and Monash University, Australia
"Nikolaj Nottelmann's Blameworthy Belief is unique in being an up-to-date monograph devoted entirely to the problem of a moral appraisal of beliefs and the closely related problem of deciding to believe (doxastic voluntarism and anti-voluntarism). It is argued that rational agents may be appropriate objects of deontic attitudes, in particular blameworthiness. Nottelmann thereby offers an original and in depth defence of the deontological conception of epistemic justification. Blameworthy Belief is bound to become a highly influential work and is of great interest not only to epistemologists, but also to philosophers of law and moral philosophers." Heinrich Wansing, Professor of Philosophy of Science and Logic, Dresden University of Technology, Germany
"Nottelmann has nicely managed to weave accounts of competing views into his discussion, and so this book provides an excellent survey of the literature en route to the development of a sensible account of how we could be said to be responsible for believing various things, even though belief formation is not under our voluntary control." John Heil, Professor of Philosophy, Washington University in St. Louis, U.S.A., and Monash University, Australia
Textul de pe ultima copertă
Believing the wrong thing may sometimes have drastic consequences. The question as to when a person is not only ill-guided, but genuinely at fault for holding a particular belief is an important one: It touches upon the roots of our understanding of such notions as criminal negligence and moral responsibility. The answer to this question may influence the extent to which we are willing to submit each other to punishments ranging from mild resentment to harsh prison terms.
This book presents an extensive effort to shed light on the conditions under which we may appropriately deem someone blameworthy for holding a particular belief. It regiments and unifies several debates within contemporary epistemology, ethics and legal scholarship. Finally, the book brings a new philosophical look on issues like our power to control beliefs and the extent and nature of foresight.
"Blameworthy Belief is unique in being an up-to-date monograph devoted entirely to the problem of a moral appraisal of beliefs and the closely related problem of deciding to believe (doxastic voluntarism and anti-voluntarism). It is bound to become a highly influential work and is of great interest not only to epistemologists, but also to philosophers of law and moral philosophers." Heinrich Wansing, Professor of Philosophy of Science and Logic, Dresden University of Technology, Germany
"Nottelmann has nicely managed to weave accounts of competing views into his discussion, and so this book provides an excellent survey of the literature en route to the development of a sensible account of how we could be said to be responsible for believing various things, even though belief formation is not under our voluntary control." John Heil, Professor of Philosophy, Washington University in St. Louis, U.S.A., and Monash University, Australia
This book presents an extensive effort to shed light on the conditions under which we may appropriately deem someone blameworthy for holding a particular belief. It regiments and unifies several debates within contemporary epistemology, ethics and legal scholarship. Finally, the book brings a new philosophical look on issues like our power to control beliefs and the extent and nature of foresight.
"Blameworthy Belief is unique in being an up-to-date monograph devoted entirely to the problem of a moral appraisal of beliefs and the closely related problem of deciding to believe (doxastic voluntarism and anti-voluntarism). It is bound to become a highly influential work and is of great interest not only to epistemologists, but also to philosophers of law and moral philosophers." Heinrich Wansing, Professor of Philosophy of Science and Logic, Dresden University of Technology, Germany
"Nottelmann has nicely managed to weave accounts of competing views into his discussion, and so this book provides an excellent survey of the literature en route to the development of a sensible account of how we could be said to be responsible for believing various things, even though belief formation is not under our voluntary control." John Heil, Professor of Philosophy, Washington University in St. Louis, U.S.A., and Monash University, Australia
Caracteristici
Provides the first extensive treatment of the notion of epistemic blameworthiness, a notion central to many philosophical concerns Brings together for the first time important legal case material, meta-ethical theory and state-of-the-art epistemology Presents a wide array of topics in contemporary philosophy, on which much interesting work is sure to be done in the near future Provides the reader with an up-to-date breath of outlook over the complex debates concerning the issues of criminal negligence, culpable ignorance, epistemic responsibility, foresight and doxastic control