Fair Revenue Sharing Mechanisms for Strategic Passenger Airline Alliances: Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, cartea 668
Autor Demet Çetineren Limba Engleză Paperback – 13 apr 2013
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Specificații
ISBN-13: 9783642358210
ISBN-10: 3642358217
Pagini: 184
Ilustrații: XV, 168 p. 27 illus.
Dimensiuni: 155 x 235 x 10 mm
Greutate: 0.3 kg
Ediția:2013
Editura: Springer Berlin, Heidelberg
Colecția Springer
Seria Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems
Locul publicării:Berlin, Heidelberg, Germany
ISBN-10: 3642358217
Pagini: 184
Ilustrații: XV, 168 p. 27 illus.
Dimensiuni: 155 x 235 x 10 mm
Greutate: 0.3 kg
Ediția:2013
Editura: Springer Berlin, Heidelberg
Colecția Springer
Seria Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems
Locul publicării:Berlin, Heidelberg, Germany
Public țintă
ResearchCuprins
Introduction.- Selected Topics in Revenue Management.- A Review of Strategic Passenger Airline Alliances.- Selected Topics in Cooperative Game Theory.- Airline Alliance Revenue Management Game.- Approximate Nucleolus-Based Revenue Shares for Airline Alliances.- Selfish Revenue Sharing Mechanisms for Airline Alliances.- A Revenue Sharing Mechanism Based on the Transfer of Dual Prices.- Conclusion and Future Research.- Appendix: Computational Study.
Recenzii
From the book reviews:
“The book has nine chapters. … the book is well-written, self-contained, and would be of interest to academics working in this area. … it brings together the theoretical (centralized) allocation approach with the heuristics for the decentralized case … .” (Arne K. Strauss, Interfaces, Vol. 44 (5), September–October, 2014)
“The book has nine chapters. … the book is well-written, self-contained, and would be of interest to academics working in this area. … it brings together the theoretical (centralized) allocation approach with the heuristics for the decentralized case … .” (Arne K. Strauss, Interfaces, Vol. 44 (5), September–October, 2014)
Notă biografică
Demet Çetiner worked as research assistant at the University of
Duisburg-Essen, Germany from 2008-2012. Since 2012 she has worked at the Supply Chain Consulting department of Bayer Technology Services.
Duisburg-Essen, Germany from 2008-2012. Since 2012 she has worked at the Supply Chain Consulting department of Bayer Technology Services.
Textul de pe ultima copertă
A major problem arising in airline alliances is to design allocation mechanisms determining how the revenue of a product should be shared among the airlines. The nucleolus is a concept of cooperative game theory that provides solutions for allocating the cost or benefit of a cooperation. This work provides fair revenue proportions for the airline alliances based on the nucleolus, which assumes a centralized decision making system. The proposed mechanism is used as a benchmark to evaluate the fairness of the revenue sharing mechanisms, where the alliance partners behave selfishly. Additionally, a new selfish revenue allocation rule is developed that improves the performance of the existing methods.
Caracteristici
Explains in detail how the operations research methods are applied to a real-life problem as revenue sharing of airline alliances Combines concepts in game theory with OR methods Includes comprehensive surveys on the related subjects Includes supplementary material: sn.pub/extras