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Freedom from Necessity: The Metaphysical Basis of Responsibility de Bernard Berofsky

Freedom from Necessity: The Metaphysical Basis of Responsibility: Routledge Library Editions: Free Will and Determinism

Autor Bernard Berofsky
en Limba Engleză Paperback – 11 dec 2018
This book, first published in 1987, is about the classic free will problem, construed in terms of the implications of moral responsibility. The principal thesis is that the core issue is metaphysical: can scientific laws postulate objectively necessary connections between an action and its causal antecedents? The author concludes they cannot, and that, therefore, free will and determinism can be reconciled.
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Specificații

ISBN-13: 9781138704862
ISBN-10: 1138704865
Pagini: 242
Dimensiuni: 156 x 234 x 13 mm
Greutate: 0.45 kg
Ediția:1
Editura: Taylor & Francis
Colecția Routledge
Seria Routledge Library Editions: Free Will and Determinism

Locul publicării:Oxford, United Kingdom

Cuprins

1. Introduction  2. The Concept of Moral Responsibility  3. Causal and Moral Responsibility  4. Intention and Moral Responsibility  5. Addiction  6. Power  7. Contingent Responsibility  8. Laws As Necessary Truths  9. The Regularity Theory of Laws  10. Autonomy  11. Responsibility and Psychological Theory

Descriere

This book, first published in 1987, is about the classic free will problem, construed in terms of the implications of moral responsibility. The principal thesis is that the core issue is metaphysical: can scientific laws postulate objectively necessary connections between an action and its causal antecedents? The author concludes they cannot.