Modelling and Analysis in Arms Control: NATO ASI Subseries F:, cartea 26
Editat de Rudolf Avenhaus, Reiner K. Huber, John D. Kettelleen Limba Engleză Paperback – 16 dec 2011
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Specificații
ISBN-13: 9783642829451
ISBN-10: 3642829457
Pagini: 504
Ilustrații: VIII, 492 p.
Dimensiuni: 170 x 244 x 26 mm
Greutate: 0.8 kg
Ediția:Softcover reprint of the original 1st ed. 1986
Editura: Springer Berlin, Heidelberg
Colecția Springer
Seria NATO ASI Subseries F:
Locul publicării:Berlin, Heidelberg, Germany
ISBN-10: 3642829457
Pagini: 504
Ilustrații: VIII, 492 p.
Dimensiuni: 170 x 244 x 26 mm
Greutate: 0.8 kg
Ediția:Softcover reprint of the original 1st ed. 1986
Editura: Springer Berlin, Heidelberg
Colecția Springer
Seria NATO ASI Subseries F:
Locul publicării:Berlin, Heidelberg, Germany
Public țintă
ResearchCuprins
I History, Lessons, Issues.- Arms Control and Strategic Military Stability.- Arms Control for the Long Term.- Arms Control - Lessons Learned and the Future.- Arms Control Frustration - Understanding the Impasse and how to Break it.- Defense Outlays and Arms Control in the Election Cycle.- II Pre-Arms Control Assessment of Options and Objectives.- Report of the Chairman: What Role can Analysis Play in Illuminating Arms Control Objectives and Options.- The Use of Arms Control Negotiations Simulation as a Bridge Between Policy and Analysis.- Pre-Arms Control Assessment of the Strategic Balance: The Impact of Objectives and Approaches.- Generation of Alternative Force Configuration for Arms Control Negotiations Using Linear Programming.- Stability, SDI, Air Defense and Deep Cuts.- Pre-Arms Control Assessment of the Conventional Balance in Europe.- On Strategic Stability in Europe Without Nuclear Weapons.- Defense Expenditure Dynamics Between Two Potential Opponents.- Deterrence and Incomplete Information - The Game Theory Approach.- III Negotiations.- Report of the Chairman: Negotiation Issues.- Two-Person Bargaining Between Threat and Fair Solution.- General Ordinal 2×2 Games in Arms Control Applications.- Building a US-Soviet Working Relationship: Ideas on Process.- Problems of Flexibility in the Nuclear Arms Race.- Superpowers and Arms Negotiations: Political Climates and Optimal Strategy.- A Computerized Third Party.- IV Verification and Post-Agreements Assessments.- Report of the Chairman: Verification and Post-Agreement Assessment.- Arms Control and Strategic Defence.- The Prospects for a Satellite Monitoring Agency.- The Feasibility of Space-Based Remote Sensing in the Verification of a Treaty to Prevent an Arms Race in Outer Space.- Notes on Arms-ControlVerification: A Game-Theoretic Analysis.- On Concepts for Solving Two-Person Games which Model the Verification Problem in Arms Control.- International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards.- Verification at the Crossroad.- Workshop Participants.- About the Authors.