The Concept of Mind
Autor Gilbert Ryle Introducere de Daniel C. Dennetten Limba Engleză Paperback – 3 feb 2003
This now-classic work challenges what Ryle calls philosophy's "official theory," the Cartesians "myth" of the separation of mind and matter. Ryle's linguistic analysis remaps the conceptual geography of mind, not so much solving traditional philosophical problems as dissolving them into the mere consequences of misguided language. His plain language and esstentially simple purpose place him in the traditioin of Locke, Berkeley, Mill, and Russell.
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Specificații
ISBN-13: 9780226732961
ISBN-10: 0226732967
Pagini: 348
Dimensiuni: 133 x 203 x 23 mm
Greutate: 0.37 kg
Ediția:1
Editura: University of Chicago Press
Colecția University of Chicago Press
ISBN-10: 0226732967
Pagini: 348
Dimensiuni: 133 x 203 x 23 mm
Greutate: 0.37 kg
Ediția:1
Editura: University of Chicago Press
Colecția University of Chicago Press
Notă biografică
Gilbert Ryle (1900-1976) was the Waynflete Professor of Metaphysical Philosophy at Oxford University from 1947-1971.
Cuprins
Introduction
I. Descartes' Myth
1. The Official Doctrine
2. The Absurdity of the Official Doctrine
3. The Origin of the Category Mistake
4. Historical Note
II. Knowing How and Knowing That
1. Foreword
2. Intelligence and Intellect
3. Knowing How and Knowing That
4. The Motives of the Intellectualist Legend
5. 'In My Head'
6. The Positive Account of Knowing How
7. Intelligent Capacities versus Habits
8. The Exercise of Intelligence
9. Understanding and Misunderstanding
10. Solipsism
III. The Will
1. Foreword
2. The Myth of Volitions
3. The Distinction Between Voluntary and Involuntary
4. Freedom of the Will
5. The Bogy of Mechanism
IV. Emotion
1. Foreword
2. Feelings versus Inclinations
3. Inclinations versus Agitations
4. Moods
5. Agitations and Feelings
6. Enjoying and Wanting
7. The Criteria of Motives
8. The Reasons and Causes of Actions
9. Conclusion
V. Dispositions and Occurrences
1. Foreword
2. The Logic of Dispositional Statements
3. Mental Capacities and Tendencies
4. Mental Occurrences
5. Achievements
VI. Self-Knowledge
1. Foreword
2. Consciousness
3. Introspection
4. Self-Knowledge Without Privileged Access
5. Disclosure by Unstudied Talk
6. The Self
7. The Systematic Elusiveness of 'I'
VII. Sensation and Observation
1. Foreword
2. Sensations
3. The Sense Datum Theory
4. Sensation and Observation
5. Phenomenalism
6. Afterthoughts
VIII. Imagination
1. Foreword
2. Picturing and Seeing
3. The Theory of Special Status Pictures
4. Imagining
5. Pretending
6. Pretending, Fancying and Imagining
7. Memory
IX. The Intellect
1. Foreword
2. The Demarcation of the Intellect
3. The Construction, Possession and Utilisation of Theories
4. The Application and Misapplication of Epistemological Terms
5. Saying and Teaching
6. the Primacy of the Intellect
7. Epistemology
X. Psychology
1. The Programme of Psychology
2. Behaviourism
Index
I. Descartes' Myth
1. The Official Doctrine
2. The Absurdity of the Official Doctrine
3. The Origin of the Category Mistake
4. Historical Note
II. Knowing How and Knowing That
1. Foreword
2. Intelligence and Intellect
3. Knowing How and Knowing That
4. The Motives of the Intellectualist Legend
5. 'In My Head'
6. The Positive Account of Knowing How
7. Intelligent Capacities versus Habits
8. The Exercise of Intelligence
9. Understanding and Misunderstanding
10. Solipsism
III. The Will
1. Foreword
2. The Myth of Volitions
3. The Distinction Between Voluntary and Involuntary
4. Freedom of the Will
5. The Bogy of Mechanism
IV. Emotion
1. Foreword
2. Feelings versus Inclinations
3. Inclinations versus Agitations
4. Moods
5. Agitations and Feelings
6. Enjoying and Wanting
7. The Criteria of Motives
8. The Reasons and Causes of Actions
9. Conclusion
V. Dispositions and Occurrences
1. Foreword
2. The Logic of Dispositional Statements
3. Mental Capacities and Tendencies
4. Mental Occurrences
5. Achievements
VI. Self-Knowledge
1. Foreword
2. Consciousness
3. Introspection
4. Self-Knowledge Without Privileged Access
5. Disclosure by Unstudied Talk
6. The Self
7. The Systematic Elusiveness of 'I'
VII. Sensation and Observation
1. Foreword
2. Sensations
3. The Sense Datum Theory
4. Sensation and Observation
5. Phenomenalism
6. Afterthoughts
VIII. Imagination
1. Foreword
2. Picturing and Seeing
3. The Theory of Special Status Pictures
4. Imagining
5. Pretending
6. Pretending, Fancying and Imagining
7. Memory
IX. The Intellect
1. Foreword
2. The Demarcation of the Intellect
3. The Construction, Possession and Utilisation of Theories
4. The Application and Misapplication of Epistemological Terms
5. Saying and Teaching
6. the Primacy of the Intellect
7. Epistemology
X. Psychology
1. The Programme of Psychology
2. Behaviourism
Index
Descriere
Descriere de la o altă ediție sau format:
Lets us re-examine many cherished ideas about knowledge, imagination, consciousness and the intellect. This book features a classic example of philosophy.
Lets us re-examine many cherished ideas about knowledge, imagination, consciousness and the intellect. This book features a classic example of philosophy.
Recenzii
'This new edition of Ryle’s classic work, with a substantial critical study by Julia Tanney, will make possible a re-assessment of Ryle and of the revolutionary potential of The Concept of Mind. Tanney’s treatment of Ryle is complex and subtle, and opens up important new ways of thinking in philosophy of mind and philosophy of language.' - Cora Diamond, University of Virginia, USA