Cantitate/Preț
Produs

The Indexical ‘I’: The First Person in Thought and Language: Synthese Library, cartea 265

Autor I. Brinck
en Limba Engleză Paperback – 6 dec 2010
The subject of this book is the first person in thought and language. The main question concerns what we mean when we say 'J'. Related to it are questions about what kinds of self-consciousness and self-knowledge are needed in order for us to have the capacity to talk about ourselves. The emphasis is on theories of meaning and reference for 'J', but a fair amount of space is devoted to 'I' -thoughts and the role of the concept of the self in cognition. The purpose is to give a picture of how we think and talk about ourselves in a wide range of circumstances. The topic has been discussed in numerous articles during the last decades, but rarely in the form of a monograph. I felt the need for a book of this kind while working on my dissertation. The manuscript is the result of many years of reflection on the self and indexicals. Some of the theories that I advance have developed as a result of my teaching an undergraduate course in the philosophy of language the last couple of years.


   
Citește tot Restrânge

Toate formatele și edițiile

Toate formatele și edițiile Preț Express
Paperback (1) 61713 lei  6-8 săpt.
  SPRINGER NETHERLANDS – 6 dec 2010 61713 lei  6-8 săpt.
Hardback (1) 62267 lei  6-8 săpt.
  SPRINGER NETHERLANDS – 31 aug 1997 62267 lei  6-8 săpt.

Din seria Synthese Library

Preț: 61713 lei

Preț vechi: 72603 lei
-15% Nou

Puncte Express: 926

Preț estimativ în valută:
11810 12421$ 9838£

Carte tipărită la comandă

Livrare economică 03-17 ianuarie 25

Preluare comenzi: 021 569.72.76

Specificații

ISBN-13: 9789048149087
ISBN-10: 9048149088
Pagini: 192
Ilustrații: XII, 179 p.
Dimensiuni: 155 x 235 x 10 mm
Greutate: 0.28 kg
Ediția:Softcover reprint of hardcover 1st ed. 1997
Editura: SPRINGER NETHERLANDS
Colecția Springer
Seria Synthese Library

Locul publicării:Dordrecht, Netherlands

Public țintă

Research

Cuprins

1. Introduction.- 1.1 The topic.- 1.2 ‘I’.- 1.3 Why ‘I’ cannot be replaced by another indexical.- 1.4 The content.- 2. ‘I’ Does Not Refer.- 2.1 The non-referential thesis.- 2.2 Wittgenstein on ‘I’.- 2.3 Anscombe’s argument.- 2.4 Immunity to error through misidentification.- 2.5 The basis of the immunity.- 3. ‘I’ Refers Directly.- 3.1 The minimal thesis.- 3.2 Direct reference.- 3.3 The semantic theory of direct reference.- 3.4 Direct reference and rigid designation.- 3.5 Rigid designation and essentialism.- 3.6 Objections to the semantic theory of direct reference.- 3.7 Perry on belief and meaning.- 3.8 Direct reference, presemantics, and pragmatics.- 3.9 Attitudes de se.- 3.10 Acquaintance and direct reference.- 4. ‘I’ Refers Indirectly.- 4.1 Indirect reference and definite descriptions.- 4.2 Frege on ‘I’.- 4.3 Does the individual concept conflict with publicness?.- 4.4 Making sense of Frege: concepts and causes.- 4.5 Making sense of Frege: the individual concept.- 5. Indexicality andNon-Conceptual Content.- 5.1 The basis of de re senses: non-conceptual content.- 5.2 Identification-free knowledge and its foundation.- 5.3 Non-conceptual content and IEM.- 5.4 Can content be non-conceptual?.- 5.5 The cognitive role of de re senses.- 6. Context-Independence.- 6.1 Speakers and persons.- 6.2 Transcending the context.- 6.3 Identity over time.- 6.4 A view from nowhere?.- 6.5 Understanding ‘I’: conclusion.- References.