The Stability Concept of Evolutionary Game Theory: A Dynamic Approach: Lecture Notes in Biomathematics, cartea 94
Autor Ross Cressmanen Limba Engleză Paperback – 24 iun 1992
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Specificații
ISBN-13: 9783540554196
ISBN-10: 354055419X
Pagini: 140
Ilustrații: VIII, 129 p.
Dimensiuni: 170 x 244 x 7 mm
Greutate: 0.24 kg
Ediția:Softcover reprint of the original 1st ed. 1992
Editura: Springer Berlin, Heidelberg
Colecția Springer
Seria Lecture Notes in Biomathematics
Locul publicării:Berlin, Heidelberg, Germany
ISBN-10: 354055419X
Pagini: 140
Ilustrații: VIII, 129 p.
Dimensiuni: 170 x 244 x 7 mm
Greutate: 0.24 kg
Ediția:Softcover reprint of the original 1st ed. 1992
Editura: Springer Berlin, Heidelberg
Colecția Springer
Seria Lecture Notes in Biomathematics
Locul publicării:Berlin, Heidelberg, Germany
Public țintă
ResearchCuprins
1. Introduction.- 2. Frequency-Dependent Evolution in a Single Haploid Species.- 1. Pure and Mixed Strategies.- 2. Monomorphic ESS’s and Stability.- 3. The Hawk-Dove Game.- 4. The Static Characterization of an ESS.- 5. Stability for the Continuous Dynamic.- 6. The Strong Stability Concept and the Dynamic Characterization of an ESS.- 7. Stability for the Discrete Dynamic.- 8. Alternative Proof of Theorem 2.5.2.- 9. Nonlinear Fitness Functions.- 10. Appendix on Centre Manifold Theory.- 3. Frequency-Dependent Evolution in a Two-Species Haploid System.- 1. Frequency-Dependent Fitness.- 2. Monomorphic ESS’s and Stability.- 3. Examples: Battle-of-the-Sexes and Edgeworth Market Games.- 4. The Static Characterization of a Two-Species ESS.- 5. Strong Stability for the Continuous Dynamic.- 6. Multi-Species Frequency-Dependent Evolution.- 4. Frequency-Dependent Evolution in a Randomly-Mating Diploid Species.- 1. Natural Selection as an Evolutionary Game.- 2. Single-Locus Models.- 3. Two-Phenotype, Frequency-Dependent Evolution at a Single Locus.- 4. Multi-Phenotype, Frequency-Dependent Evolution at a Single Locus.- 5. A Two-Locus, Two-Allele, Two-Phenotype Example.- 5. Frequency- and Density-Dependent Evolution in a Haploid Species.- 1. Frequency- and Density-Dependent Fitness (and the Haploid Dynamic).- 2. Monomorphic DDESS’s and Stability.- 3. The Density-Dependent Hawk-Dove Game.- 4. The DDESS Conditions and Strong Stability.- 5. Density-Dependent Natural Selection as a Haploid Evolutionary Game.- 6. Evolutionary Stability in Multi-Species Population-Dynamic Models.- An Intermission.- 6. Evolutionary Stable Sets and Contestant Information.- 1. A Mixed-Strategy Hawk-Dove Game.- 2. The Static Characterization of an ES Set.- 3. The Dynamic Characterization of an ES Set.- 4.The Hawk-Dove Game with Varying Resource.- 5. ES Sets for Games in Extensive Form.- 6. The Owner-Intruder Game.- 7. Multi-Stage Games.- 7. References.- 8. Index.