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Twenty Lectures on Algorithmic Game Theory

Autor Tim Roughgarden
en Limba Engleză Paperback – 30 aug 2016
Computer science and economics have engaged in a lively interaction over the past fifteen years, resulting in the new field of algorithmic game theory. Many problems that are central to modern computer science, ranging from resource allocation in large networks to online advertising, involve interactions between multiple self-interested parties. Economics and game theory offer a host of useful models and definitions to reason about such problems. The flow of ideas also travels in the other direction, and concepts from computer science are increasingly important in economics. This book grew out of the author's Stanford University course on algorithmic game theory, and aims to give students and other newcomers a quick and accessible introduction to many of the most important concepts in the field. The book also includes case studies on online advertising, wireless spectrum auctions, kidney exchange, and network management.
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Specificații

ISBN-13: 9781316624791
ISBN-10: 131662479X
Pagini: 352
Dimensiuni: 150 x 226 x 20 mm
Greutate: 0.5 kg
Editura: Cambridge University Press
Colecția Cambridge University Press
Locul publicării:New York, United States

Cuprins

1. Introduction and examples; 2. Mechanism design basics; 3. Myerson's Lemma; 4. Algorithmic mechanism design 34; 5. Revenue-maximizing auctions; 6. Simple near-optimal auctions; 7. Multi-parameter mechanism design; 8. Spectrum auctions; 9. Mechanism design with payment constraints; 10. Kidney exchange and stable matching; 11. Selfish routing and the price of anarchy; 12. Network over-provisioning and atomic selfish routing; 13. Equilibria: definitions, examples, and existence; 14. Robust price-of-anarchy bounds in smooth games; 15. Best-case and strong Nash equilibria; 16. Best-response dynamics; 17. No-regret dynamics; 18. Swap regret and the Minimax theorem; 19. Pure Nash equilibria and PLS-completeness; 20. Mixed Nash equilibria and PPAD-completeness.

Recenzii

'There are several features of this book that make it very well suited both for the classroom and for self-study … if your interest is in understanding how game theory, economics and computer science are cross-pollinating to address challenges of the design of online strategic interactions, this is the book to start with. It is clear, well-organized and makes a compelling introduction to a vibrant field.' David Burke, MAA Reviews

Notă biografică


Descriere

This accessible introduction features case studies in online advertising, spectrum auctions, kidney exchange, and network management.