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Bounded Rational Behavior in Experimental Games and Markets: Proceedings of the Fourth Conference on Experimental Economics, Bielefeld, West Germany, September 21–25, 1986: Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, cartea 314

Editat de Reinhard Tietz, Wulf Albers, Reinhard Selten
en Limba Engleză Paperback – 27 iul 1988

Din seria Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems

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Specificații

ISBN-13: 9783540500360
ISBN-10: 3540500367
Pagini: 380
Ilustrații: VI, 368 p.
Dimensiuni: 170 x 244 x 20 mm
Greutate: 0.6 kg
Ediția:Softcover reprint of the original 1st ed. 1988
Editura: Springer Berlin, Heidelberg
Colecția Springer
Seria Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems

Locul publicării:Berlin, Heidelberg, Germany

Public țintă

Research

Cuprins

I. Experimental Economics.- Experimental Economics: Ways to Model Bounded Rational Bargaining Behavior — Introductory Remarks to the Fourth Conference on Experimental Economics.- Experimental Economics: A Psychological Perspective.- II. Unilateral Decisions.- Normative and Individual Strategies in Social Dilemmata.- Learning to Make Good Predictions in Time Series.- A Preliminary Analysis of a Large-Scale Experimental Investigation into Consumption under Uncertainty.- Mental Representation in Multistage Decision Making.- III. Bilateral Decisions.- Stability and Outcome Tradeoffs in Asymmetric Dilemmas: Conditions Promoting the Discovery of Alternating Solutions.- The Influence of Social Orientation and Generalized Expectancies on Decision Making in Iterated Experimental Games.- Ultimatum Bargaining for a Shrinking Cake — An Experimental Analysis.- Bounded Rational Strategies in Sequential Bargaining: An Experiment and a Learning by Evolution Strategy.- Semi-Normative Properties of Bounded Rational Bargaining Theories.- Modeling Mediator Behavior in Experimental Games.- IV. Auctions and Markets.- Dual Ceteris Paribus Comparisons: Some Initial Thoughts on Laboratory Isolation of Equilibrium Forces in Auction Markets.- Learning in Common Value Auctions.- Inflation and Expectations in Experimental Markets.- Modeling Investment Behavior in an Experimental Market.- V. Coalition Formation.- Order of Strength and Exhaustivity as Additional Hypotheses in Theories for 3-Person Characteristic Function Games.- The Effects of Justice Norms in a Bargaining Situation.- Modeling Coalition Formation in Inessential Probabilistic Games.- Sequential Games of Status: A Replication.- Equal Share Analysis for Location Games.- Limits of Rational Behavior in Cooperatively Played Normal FormGames.- Revealed Aspirations and Reciprocal Loyalty in Apex Games.- VI. Bibliography.- Selected Bibliography of the Participant’s Contributions to Experimental Economics.- Author Index.