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Decision-Making in Committees: Game-Theoretic Analysis: Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, cartea 635

Autor Nicola Friederike Maaser
en Limba Engleză Paperback – 4 feb 2010
Political and economic institutions are typically governed by committees that face the challenge to reconcile the preferences of their members. How should decision rules be designed to generate fair and sustainable agreements, for example if committee members represent groups of different sizes? This book uses game-theoretic concepts and models to address the issue of political decision-making processes. In addition to providing a survey on basic game-theoretic tools in the analysis of political decisions, the author looks at specific issues such as two-tiered voting systems or the influence of lobbyists on legislative committees, and shows how the models can be applied to real-world contexts such as the EU decision-making institutions.
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Specificații

ISBN-13: 9783642041525
ISBN-10: 3642041523
Pagini: 150
Ilustrații: XXII, 126 p. 26 illus.
Dimensiuni: 155 x 235 x 12 mm
Greutate: 0.22 kg
Ediția:2010
Editura: Springer Berlin, Heidelberg
Colecția Springer
Seria Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems

Locul publicării:Berlin, Heidelberg, Germany

Public țintă

Research

Cuprins

Games and Political Decisions.- Committees as Representative Institutions.- Robust Equal Representation.- Committees and Lobby Coalition Formation.

Textul de pe ultima copertă

Political and economic institutions are typically governed by committees that face the challenge to reconcile the preferences of their members. How should decision rules be designed to generate fair and sustainable agreements, for example if committee members represent groups of different sizes? This book uses game-theoretic concepts and models to address the issue of political decision-making processes. In addition to providing a survey on basic game-theoretic tools in the analysis of political decisions, the author looks at specific issues such as two-tiered voting systems or the influence of lobbyists on legislative committees, and shows how the models can be applied to real-world contexts such as the EU decision-making institutions.

Caracteristici

Includes supplementary material: sn.pub/extras