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Game Theory and Applications

Editat de Leon Petrosjan, V. V. Mazalov
en Limba Engleză Hardback – 31 mai 2008
This volume brings together papers of well-known specialists in game theory and adjacent problems. It presents the basic results in dynamic games, stochastic games, applications of game theorectical methods in ecology and economics and the methodological aspects of game theory.
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Specificații

ISBN-13: 9781604562972
ISBN-10: 1604562978
Pagini: 231
Dimensiuni: 186 x 260 x 21 mm
Greutate: 0.68 kg
Editura: Nova Science Publishers Inc

Cuprins

Preface; Decisions Between Incompletely Informed Agents: A Basic Rating Game; Cost Sharing in Electricity Transmission Grid; Fixed Benefit Games; Resource Extraction Activity: An Intergenerational Approach; Information Protocols and Extensive Games in Inductive Game Theory; Uncertainty Aversion and Theory of Incomplete Contract; Bioresource Management Problem with Changing Area for Fishery; Associated Consistency Based on Utility Functions of Coalitions; On the Not-Preference-Based Hoede-Bakker Index; The Differential Game with "A Survival Zone" with Different Classes of Admissible Control Functions; An Overall-coalitional Marginalistic Value for Set Games; Game-Theoretic Study of Divisible Good Auctions; Innovation Game With Large Entrants; A Solution Defined by Fine Vectors; On the Stability of Oligopoly Model with a Cournot Fringe; Index.