Large-scale Privatization via Auctions: The case of land in transforming economies: Kasseler Wirtschafts- und Verwaltungswissenschaften, cartea 7

1. Introduction: Overview of the Problems and Issues in Transformation.- 1.1 Macroeconomic Level Issues.- 1.2 Microeconomic Issues.- 1.3 The Role of Privatization in Transforming Economies.- 2. Privatization: Concept, Theory, Issues and Experiences.- 2.1 Reasons for Privatization.- 2.2 Other Theories of Privatization.- 2.3 Methods of Privatization.- 2.4 Preliminary Assessment of the Results of Privatization Activities.- 2.5 Issues in the Privatization of Land in Transforming Economies.- 3. Objectives and Scope of the Study.- 3.1 Analytic Framework.- 3.2 Mechanism Design and Auction.- 4. The Theory of Incentives and Mechanism Design.- 4.1 The Nature of Information.- 4.2 Information Asymmetry and the P-A Problem.- 4.3 The Theory of Mechanism Design.- 5. Auction Mechanisms.- 5.1 The Static Bayesian Game and the Bayesian-Nash Equilibrium Concept.- 5.2 The Single Unit Auction Game: The Benchmark Model.- 5.3 Effects of Risk Aversion.- 5.4 Sales Revenue.- 5.5 Affiliated Valuation and the Winner’s Curse.- 5.6 Multiple-Unit Auctions.- 6. Auctions in Privatization.- 6.1 Overview.- 6.2 The P-A Problem Revisited.- 6.3 Recent Experiences.- 6.4 Auction for Privatizing Land.- 7. Modeling an Auction Mechanism for Land.- 7.1 Design Considerations.- 7.2 Multiple-Unit Auction of Land.- 7.3 Effects of Restrictions in Land Privatization.- 8. Summary and Conclusions: Issues and Implications in the Use of Auctions for Land Privatization.- 8.1 Economic Efficiency and Overall Welfare Effects.- 8.2 Informational Burden.- 8.3 Financial Aspects.- 8.4 Equity and Fairness.- 8.5 Private Land Market Development.- 8.6 Political, Institutional, and Legal Aspects.- 9. Zusammenfassung.- 10. References.

Dr. Jocelyn Braun war wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin am Lehrstuhl von Prof. Dr. Wilhelm Brandes am Institut für Agrarökonomie der Georg-August Universität in Göttingen. Seit 1996 ist sie Lehrbeauftragte am Lehrstuhl von Prof. Dr. Rainer Stöttner, Fachgebiet Finanzierung, Banken, Versicherung, an der Universität GH Kassel.

Successful large-scale privatization programs for highly political resources such as land require the consideration not only of economic but also of ethical aspects. On the basis of a game-theoretic framework of analysis, Jocelyn Braun shows that the mechanism of auctioning is an efficient and equitable alternative to many privatization methods that have so far been implemented with disappointing results. The author presents a solution concept and - using Bayesian mechanism design - expands the current theoretical and practice-oriented literature in the light of transformation.